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THE COMMON-LAW
APPROACH TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW
JOHN C. H. WU*
T HERE ARE AT PRESENT two mighty forces working in the world in
contrary directions. One force is working toward international
anarchy, the other toward international order. This is so because the
ideologies at the back of them are diametrically opposed to each other.
One ideology holds that there can be no law above the state, for the
ultimate source of all law is the will of the state. This is the logical
position of juridical positivism, which defines law exclusively in terms of
the command of a political superior, and flatly denies the natural law as
an essential element of a legal system. In the absence, therefore, of a
world-state, there cannot be international law. The state as the absolute
sovereign is a law to itself.
Modern juridical positivism had its origin in the works of Thomas
Hobbes, and came to be enshrined in the writings of the so-called
analytical school of jurisprudence, from Austin to Holland. In his well-
known textbook of Jurisprudence, Holland wrote:
Convenient therefore as is on many accounts the phrase "International
Law," to express those rules of conduct in accordance with which, either
in conseqience of their express consent, or in pursuance of the usage of
the civilised world, nations are expected to act, it is impossible to regard
these rules as being in reality anything more than the moral code of nations.'
It is a curious phenomenon in the history of legal thought that England,
the home of the common law, should also have been the birthplace of
juridical positivism, whose approach to international law is the very
antipode to the common-law approach. The common law is too deeply
rooted in Christian humanism to be blighted altogether by the deathly
winds of positivism and materialism. Even in the field of legal philosophy
*Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law; Member, The Permanent
Court of Arbitration at The Hague.
I HOLLAND, JURISPRUDENCE 131-32 (11th ed. 1910).
there has arisen in England a strong reac-
tion against the positivist denial of the law
of nations. But of this later.
What I want to bring out just now is that
in the present century the Leviathan has
found its paradise in the totalitarian states.
It is a significant fact that the platform of
atheistic communism is international in its
designs of world revolution, but at the same
time it is extremely nationalistic when it
comes to the question of limiting by law the
arbitrary powers of the Leviathan. Thus,
this ideology stands, on the one hand, for
unlimited power of control inside the state,
and on the other hand for absolute freedom
from legal control outside the state. It
adopts a thorough-going collectivism in the
national sphere, and a thorough-going indi-
vidualism in the international sphere. Law-
lessness is the connecting thread between
tire two. The state has taken the place of
God, and the will of the dominant class has
taken the place of law. Man as such is com-
pletely lost sight of. The group is all, the
human person nothing.
What the Russian representative said
concerning the "Universal Declaration of
Human Rights" at the fihal meeting of the
General Assembly of the United Nations on
December 10, 1948, epitomizes this ide-
ology:
It was an entirely false theory that the
principle of national sovereignty was a reac-
tionary and outdated idea, and that the re-
pudiation of that principle was an essential
condition of international co-operation. The
draft declaration of human rights appeared
to endorse that reactionary view directed
against national sovereignty and was there-
fore entirely inconsistent with the principles
of the United Nations. 2
2 U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 3rd Sess., 923-24
(1948). Quoted in LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 403 n. 37 (1950).
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In these words the Leviathan showed its
teeth and claws. The Leviathan will always
refuse to be tamed by the laws. Relying
upon its own strength, it feels at home only
in the sea of lawlessness. It simply cannot
recognize the rights of man without com-
promising its assumed unlimited sover-
eignty.
The other ideology, which is still in for-
mation but is growing stronger every day,
places humanity above the state, and de-
rives the law of nations, not from the will
of the state, but from the moral dignity
and rational nature of man. It stands for
a government of limited powers and for a
balanced federalism within the nation, a
federalism which is the natural preparation
for a global federalism. It does not repudi-
ate sovereignty, but conceives of it as ethical
in foundation, pluralistic in distribution, rel-
ative to the purpose of the common good,
and circumscribed within the limits of law
and reason.3 It holds that the sovereignty
of the state is subordinate to the sovereignty
of'law and the reign of reason, and that the
existence of the state can only be made
secure and meaningful in a just and stable
international order, just as the personality
of the individual human being can only be
fully realized within the framework of a
well organized society. It does not idolize
the state, for it views the state as sub Deo
et sub lege; and for this very reason it does
not find it necessary to look forward to a
stateless society. In one word, there is only
one true sovereignty, the sovereignty of
law; all other forms of sovereignty are de-
rived from the law and are relative to it.
Although this ideology is not so clear-cut
3 For a more detailed elaboration of this problem,
see Wu, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JURISPRUDENCE
182-84 (1958).
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and ruthless as the other, yet there is no
question that an overwhelming majority of
nations belong to this group. 4
The unprecedented tension in the world
situation has been brought about by the fact
that while science has transformed the world
into a neighborhood, the gospel of hate
has made all neighborliness impossible. A
neighborhood without neighborliness -this,
in sum, is the agony of our age.
In his excellent little treatise on The Law
of Nations, J. L. Brierly of Oxford has made
a most candid observation which every stu-
dent of international law of today should
take to heart. After pointing out how the
rapid technological developments in indust-
try and transport have brought about a close
interdependence of states, Brierly proceeds
to say:
This growing modern interdependence of
states makes the problem of developing in-
4 Take, for instance, the words of Dr. T. V.
Soong, Head of the Chinese Delegation, address-
ing the United Nations Conference in San Fran-
cisco in 1945: "If there is any message that my
country ... wishes to give to this Conference, it is
that we are prepared . . . to yield if necessary a
part of our sovereignty to the new international
organization in the interest of collective security."
Quoted in LIN YUTANG, ON THE WISDOM OF
AMERICA 428 (1950). At present, there is among
American lawyers a salutary movement of "World
Peace Through Law." The institution of the Law
Day is symptomatic of the same tendency, widely
supported by public opinion. To take a random
instance, Victoria Advocate, May 1, 1959 said:
"The United States is now working for universal
acceptance of law as the only way to settle dis-
putes between nations. These aims are important
enough to justify a partial surrender of national
sovereignty. They may be ultimately attained by
strengthening the authority of the United Na-
tions." See also JEssup, A MODERN LAW OF NA-
TIONs 41 (1948), where the author states that
"sovereignty in its old connotations of ultimate
freedom of national will unrestricted by law is not
consistent with the principles of community inter-
est or interdependence and of the status of the
individual as a subject of international law."
ternational law more urgent, but unfortu-
nately it does not necessarily make it easier.
When the ideological differences between
states are as deep as they are today, the fre-
quent and public contacts between states
which follow from the provision of institu-
tions for encouraging their collaboration
may have exactly the opposite effect. Such
institutions, as Soviet Russia has made only
too clear, offer a convenient sounding-board
for virulent and continuous invective, and
may therefore only serve to aggravate an
already dangerous situation. When states do
not even share in a common desire to work
together, it might be better that for the time
being they should cease to go through the
motions of co-operation. 5
What Can the Common Law
Contribute to International Law?
What, then, shall we do, and what can
we do? Shall we change our premises and
compromise our principles in order to pac-
ify the atheistic materialists? That would,
of course, be morally wrong; but aside from
this, such a course would be stupid even
from a pragmatic point of view. In the
present situation, I sincerely believe that
appeasement is the surest way to war,
while preparedness for self-defence and for
the defence of right and justice is the surest
way to peace. In fact, our very preparedness
to support the Rule of Law with all our
might may induce others to change their
hearts.
But this preparedness, necessary as it is,
is only a condition to more positive con-
tributions to the establishment of interna-
tional order. One of the most important
things that we can do is to leaven the law
of nations with the spirit of the common
law. There are many reasons why I think
5 BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 91 (4th ed.
1949).
so highly of the common law. In the first
place, the common law, being cradled in
Christian humanism, respects man as man.
The American Bar Association Journal has,
not so long ago, emphatically declared in
an editorial, "Now, as never before, it is our
duty to show to the world that the common
law regards man as having the dignity of a
being made in-the image of his Maker rather
than the status of a brick in the hands of
a human architect of a social structure."6
This is the fundamental starting point of
the common law, which marks it off clearly
from the legal systems of any totalitarian
states. I submit this is the only sound foun-
dation for international law. A right con-
ception of the relation between man and
state is the sine qua non of a stable world
order.
In the second place, as the common law
has for the most part been hammered out
on the anvil of litigation by lawyers and
judges, who must give their considered rea-
sons in their arguments and decisions, it is
but natural that instead of appealing to
will and power, the common law has ac-
quired the habit of appealing to reason and
reasonableness. This has kept the common
law in constant contact with the natural-
law, which consists of precepts of natural
reason.
In the third place, the common law is a
dynamic system of law. One of its operative
principles is: "When the reason for a law
ceases, so ceases the law." Another more
positive principle is that when the reason
for a law expands, so does the law. This
principle has not been articulated, but I
have drawn the formula from a study of
many modern cases.
In the fourth place, the common law,
642 A.B.A.J. 248 (1956).
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having absorbed the spirit of equity, has
grown more and more conscious of itself
as the handmaid of justice. The words of
Lord Penzance are representative of the
true tradition of the common law: "The
picture of law triumphant and justice pros-
trate is not, I am aware, without admirers.
To me it is a very sorry spectacle. The spirit
of justice does not reside in formalities, or
words, nor is the triumph of its administra-
tion to be found in successfully picking a
way between the pitfalls of technicality.
After all, the law is, or ought to be, the
handmaid of justice, and inflexibility, which
is the most becoming robe of the latter,
often serves to render the former gro-
tesq ue. 
'7
In the fifth place, the common law is an
open system. Being itself unwritten law,
born from the womb of time through the
judicial process, the common law easily rec-
ognizes international law for its kith and
kin. For instance, in the interesting case of
New Jersey v. Delaware, involving the doc-
trine of the Thalweg, Justice Cardozo wrote:
International law, or the law that governs
between states, has at times, like the com-
mon law within states, a twilight existence
during which it is hardly distinguishable
from morality or justice, till at length the
imprimatur of a court attests its jural qual-
ity. The gradual consolidation of opinions
and habits has been doing its silent work.8
Lastly, the common law not only induces
a law-abidingness in its people, but is itself
a law-abiding system. It conceives of the
international law as having an objective
existence entitled to be recognized in its
own right. There is no iron curtain separat-
7 Combe v. Edwards, 3 P.D. 103, 142 (1878).
8 New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U. S. 361, 383-84
(1934).
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ing the common law of a country from the
common law of the nations.
As early as 1735, Lord Chancellor Tal-
bot, in Barbuit's Case, declared: "The law
of nations in its fullest extent is and forms
part of the laN of England." 9 Lord Mans-
field expressed the common-law attitude
when he said as Solicitor General, that the
law of nations "is founded on justice, equity,
convenience, and the reason of the thing,
and confirmed by long usage.""' Sir William
Scott, later Lord Stowell, who may be called
the Father of Modern Prize Law, spoke to
the same effect: "The seat of judicial au-
thority is, indeed, locally here, in the bellig-
erent country, according to the known law
and practice of nations: but the law itself
has no locality .... If, therefore, I mistake
the law in this matter, I mistake that which
I consider, and which I mean should be
considered, as the universal law upon the
question: a question regarding one of the
most important rights of belligerent nations
relating to neutrals." 11 True, the interpreta-
tion of the universal law is inevitably col-
ored more or less by the modes and habits
of thinking characteristic of the nation of
which the judge happens to be a member;
but this is only a psychological tendency
against which we must counteract as far as
possible. It is one thing to say that we
cannot rid ourselves entirely of subjectivity;
it is quite another thing to make a deliberate
choice of subjective voluntarism. It is one
thing to concede that our understanding of
the objective referent may be erroneous; it
is quite another to say that therefore there
is no objective referent.
It is indeed remarkable that even after
9 CASES IN EQUITY DURING THE TIME OF LORD
CHANCELLOR TALBOT 287 (1735).
10 HOLLIDAY, LIFE OF WILLIAM, EARL OF MANS-
FIELD 428 (1797).
11 The Maria, I C.Rob. 340, 350 (1798).
the rise of juridical positivism, which re-
fused to consider anything as law which is
not the will of a political superior, the
common-law tradition has remained intact
from its pernicious influence. In The Pa-
quette Habana, for instance, the Supreme
Court of the United States, per Justice
Gray, said:
By an ancient usage among civilized na-
tions, beginning centuries ago, and gradually
ripening into a rule of international law,
coast fishing vessels, pursuing their vocation
and bringing in fresh fish, have been recog-
nized as exempt, with their cargoes and
crews, from capture as prize of war. 12
Now, it is plain that this rule of inter-
national law did not owe its existence to the
will of any political superior, for the simple
reason that there was, and is, none such.
The world has not yet become a State, but
no court, whether national or international,
has ever denied the existence of a law which
governs the relations between the states. 13
There are treaties, of course; but what
makes treaties binding is the law, and what
makes the law binding is reason, for, as
Lord Coke expressed it, "Reason is the soul
of law.' 4 The very principle pacta . . .
sunt observanda is a principle of law and
reason, not derived from any pact or the
will of any state.
12The Paquette Habana, 175 U. S. 677, 686
(1900).
13 This is true at least of the common-law coun-
tries and other nations outside of the totalitarian
states. What Chief Justice Waite said in United
States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 (1887), is charac-
teristic of the common-law attitude: "But if the
United States can require this of another [to
penalize the counterfeiting of U. S. currency], that
other may require it of them, because interna-
tional obligations are of necessity reciprocal in
their nature. The right, if it exists at all, is given
by the law of nations, and what is law for one is,
under the same circumstances, law for the other."
Id. at 487.
14 COKE, LITTLETON, Epilogue.
The Unity of the Conception of Law
If reason is the life of the common law,
why should it not be the life of international
law? If the "reasonable man" is the hero of
the common law, what prevents us from
making the "reasonable nation" the hero of
international law? If, to further the ends of
justice, the common law has not hesitated
to pierce the veil of corporate entity, why
cannot international law for weighty rea-
sons pierce the ,magical scales of the Levi-
athan so as to protect the rights of men? If
the corporation is a juristic person existing
by virtue of the municipal law, why should
we not say that the state is a juristic person
existing by virtue of international law?
A sound philosophy of law is general in
its scope of validity. It must be built upon
true humanism. One of the Founding Fath-
ers of this Republic, James Wilson, gave
expression to this humanism when with
Socratic irony he pointed out, in Chisolm
v. Georgia, "[H] ow true it is that states and
governments were made for man; and at
the same time how true it is that his crea-
tures and servants have first deceived, next
vilified, and at last oppressed their master
and maker." 15 For him, the difference be-
tween man and state is the difference be-
tween end and means. "Man, fearfully ...
made, is the workmanship of his all perfect
Creator. A State, useful and valuable as the
contrivance is, is the . . . contrivance of
man, and from his native dignity derives all
its acquired importance."' 6 I am aware that
this noble principle has had many setbacks
even in this great democracy. But that does
not effect its intrinsic value or its vital force.
The Founding Fathers were far-sighted. If
15 2 U. S. (2 DalI.) 419, 455 (1793).
16 Ibid.
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later generations have failed to live up to
their ideals, this proves nothing against
them and the future generations are sure
to move to the measure of their thought. 7
The humanism of the common law is not
a Godless humanism. It is a 'Christian hu-
manism, which bases the dignity of man on
the existence of the immortal soul made iv
the image of God.
In the present world crisis, many people
are becoming pessimistic and cynical. Yet,
as I read the signs of the times, our age is
not without hope. To mention but one of
them, the revival in the Western nations of
the natural-law philosophy is a sure sign
that the tides have turned from the lowest
ebb and begun to flow again. As is well
known, international law was founded upon
natural law. The works of men like Suarez,
Vittoria, Grotius, and Pufendorf, to mention
the most influential, were saturated with
natural-law principles and ideas. Our return
to the natural-law philosophy, enriched by
a deeper knowledge of the human psychol-
ogy and accumulated experience, may very
well herald a new period of growth of inter-
national law.
It is encouraging to see that contempo-
rary legal philosophers in England have
reacted strongly against juridical positivism.
Commenting upon Holland's negative re-
mark about international law, which we
have quoted already, Sir Arthur Goodhart
has brought out the irony of his position:
It is difficult to believe that the author of
this statement was the Chichele Professor of
17 As Mr. John B. Gest has observed, "Truly it can
be said that the hope for order within the nation
and in the world is through the restoration of our
traditional political and legal philosophy that men
are endowed by their Creator with certain inalien..
able rights and that to secure these rights govern-
ments are instituted...." Natural Law and
Positivism, 22 PENN. B.A.J. 270, 277 (1951).
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International Law in the University of Ox-
ford, and President of the Institute de Droit
International. It must be rare, indeed, to find
a professor who alleges that the subject
which he purports to teach does not exist.
Holland was forced to reach this conclusion
because, being an Austinian, he defined law
as a command.18
Similarly, J. L. Brierly has been quite
outspoken in favor of the natural-law phi-
losophy as against juridical positivism. "If
we are to explain why any kind of law is
binding," he writes, "we cannot avoid some
such assumption as that which the Middle
Ages made, and which Greece and Rome
had made before them, when they spoke of
natural law." 19 This conclusion has been ar-
rived at by Brierly and many other contem-
porary jurists as a result of a deeper analysis
of juridical realities than the so-called "ana-
lytical school" was able to offer. It seems to
me that the trouble with the "analytical"
jurists does not lie in their being too ana-
lytical, but rather in their being not analyti-
cal enough.
Let us analyze, for instance, the sources
of the modern law of nations. 20 Article 38
of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice lays down three principal sources of
law: (1) international conventions, whether
general or particular, establishing rules ex-
pressly recognized by the contesting states;
(2) international custom, as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law; and (3)
the general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations. In addition to these, it fur-
ther recognizes two "subsidiary means for
18 GOODHART, ENGLISH LAW AND THE MORAL LAW
66-67 (1953).
19 BRIERLY, op. cit. supra note 5, at 57.
20 See BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW
AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRI-
BUNALS (1953).
the determination of law," namely, judicial
decisions and the teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists of the various
nations.
This authoritative statement of the
sources of international law is significant
in more senses than one. In the first place,
it confirms the view that the existence of
international law is quite independent of the
existence of a world state. In the second
place, it recognizes the objective existence
of a law transcendental to any particular
state and binding upon it as such. In the
third place, by recognizing "general princi-
ples of the law" as a source by which the
Court shall draw the appropriate norms for
deciding the cases submitted to it, it facili-
tates the future development of international
law. As Brierly sees it, although it "intro-
duces no novelty into the system, for the
'general principles of law' are the source to
which international courts have instinctively
and properly referred to in the past," yet
"its inclusion is important as a rejection of
the positivist doctrine, according to which
international law consists solely of rules to
which states have given their consent. '21
Brierly further sees in this provision "an
authoritative recognition of a dynamic ele-
ment in international law, and of the crea-
tive function of the courts which administer
it.'2 2
This is a typical common-law view of in-
ternational law. In fact, even in national
tribunals of the common-law countries, in-
ternational law has always been treated as
authoritative in its own right, and the doc-
trine of incorporation which regards inter-
national law as part of the municipal law
has served as a method of implementing and
2! BRIERLY, op. cit. supra note 5, at 64.
22 Ibid.
effectuating the fundamental principle. Pro-
fessor. Edwin D. Dickinson has traced the
influence of the changing concepts of law
on this doctrine through the centuries. 23
When natural-law philosophy prevailed, in-
ternational law was incorporated in the
common law as a matter of course. In the
nineteenth century, when juridical positiv-
ism became the order of the day, the com-
mon law managed to preserve the sound
kernel of the doctrine of incorporation by
introducing the fiction of implied consent,
so as to save the face of the prevailing
theory deriving the binding force of inter-
national law from the consent of the nation.
For the common law is a past master in
the art of satisfying the demands of natural
justice by means of accommodating con-
cepts and fictions born of artificial or juris-
tic reasoning. As Professor Dickinson has
so shrewdly observed, in reality the refer-
ence to the nation's consent, whether im-
plied or expressed, does not "state one
of the doctrine's essential elements. '24 It
merely pays a lip service to "the prevailing
positivist theory which founds international
law upon consent. When the positivist the-
ory has been supplanted by another theory,
the reference to consent may disappear. As
it is actually applied therefore the Anglo-
American doctrine of incorporation is fun-
damentally sound. '25
It is my sincere belief that if the lawyers
of the common-law countries would take
23 See Dickinson, Changing Concepts and the
Doctrine of Incorporation, 26 AM. J. INT'L L.
239-60 (1932); The Law of Nations as Part of
the Nat'onal Law of the United States, 101 U. PA.
L. REV. 26-56 (1952), 792-883 (1953).
24 As quoted in BRIERLY, op. cit. supra note 5,
at 84.
25 Ibid. See also Brown, The Natural Law as the
Moral Basis of fnternational Justice, 8 LOYOLA
L. REV. 59-68 (1955-56).
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more interest in the questions of interna-
tional law, and cultivate it with the spirit
and methods of the common law, they will
be able to make great contributions toward
the establishment of the Rule of Law in the
international community. I have such faith
in the common law that some of my friends
have teased me by hinting that I had per-
haps taken an old lady for a young girl. But
a great authority on the natural law, Dr.
Heinrich Rommen, in reviewing my Foun-
tain o1 Justice,2 6 has defended my love for
the common law in eloquent words, which
should convince the reasonable man. Here
is what Dr. Rommen has written: "He
shows a genuine love for the Anglo-Amer-
ican common law - so much so that some
critics might contend that he is blind to
some of its shortcomings. This reviewer,
who partakes of this love for the same rea-
sons as does Dr. Wu, agrees that the con-
servatism of the common law and the fact
that it was judge-made jus enabled it to
preserve its natural law inspiration, despite
a prevailing positivism in the general cli-
mate of culture and in jurisprudence." When
a German jurist endorses the love of a
Chinese for the common law, one may be
sure that the common law must be some-
thing of a universal attraction.
The beauty of the common law is that
while it is extremely conservative when the
immutable principles of justice and equity
are concerned, it can be extremely flexible
and elastic, and infinitely resourceful, in
devising the ways and means of effectuating
those principles. Occasionally, it is true, you
will come across judges who seem to con-
fuse ends and means, either taking means
for the end, or taking ends for the means.
26 Rommen, Book Review, 44 GEO. L. J. 539
(1956).
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When one regards means as the end, it is
a symptom that his intellectual arteries
have hardened and his decisions are likely
to be as prickly as a hedgehog. When one re-
gards an end as mere means, his intelligence
may be extremely subtle, but you some-
times would wonder whether he has any
fixed principles. His opinions may be as
spineless as the jelly fish. However, such
freaks are not too many. On the whole, a
robust sense of justice and an open-minded
realism have combined to keep a majority
of judges to the main tradition of the com-
mon law.
The common law has never succumbed
to the "will theory" of law. The common
law has regarded reason as its essence with
the "reasonable man" as its hero. This basic
insight about the nature of law is the only
possible foundation upon which interna-
tional law can be erected.
In conclusion, let me say that just as the
Roman law served as the midwife and nurse
of international law in its infancy, so the
common law should act as its pedagogue
and guardian in the process of its develop-
ment and growth.
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